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Insurances as Part of Human Security, 
their Timescapes, and Spatiality 
Cornel Zwierlein  
Abstract: »Versicherungen als Element von Human Security, ihre Zeitregime 
und ihr Raumbezug«. In the present discussion on ‘Human Security’, Insur-
ances have been only lately involved. The contribution starts with the assump-
tion that Insurances are historically an especially fruitful object of research for 
the general question of the history of security regimes. It shows that, contrary 
to some suggestions held in risk sociology, early Mediterranean maritime in-
surances are to be judged rather as something completely different than the 
modern insurances from the 17th century onwards managed by merchants’ 
companies and states. The latter belonged to a secular process of constructing a 
‘normal secure society’ during enlightenment. The relationship between 
Timescapes, Spatiality and Insurances is analyzed: are Insurances per se an in-
strument of colonizing ‘the future’ because they are instrumental in calculating 
and constructing clearly defined ‘risks’? or is that future orientation just one 
element, but is perhaps the wider socio-political context with its prevailing 
timescapes in which the insurance operations were embedded a changing one 
from pre- to postmodernity? Asking those questions the article contributes to 
an approach of using ‘human security’ as a heuristical device to explore the 
history of security production. 
Keywords: Insurances, Insurance history, fire insurance, risk, conceptions of 
time, spatiality, timescapes, colonial perceptions, normal secure society, Sun 
Fire Office, microfinance. 
 
Insurances do not play a great role in the standard discussion of ‘Human Secu-
rity’: Even though the core element of the concept is the dismissal of a state-
centered perspective on security politics, for a great deal the problems treated 
under that notion are situated in quite classical fields of political thinking and 
international relations: consequences of asymmetric wars, responsibility to 
protect, Crime and Violence.1 Still, we always think of the providers of Human 
Security rather as actors in the larger sphere of politics (UN, states, state affine 
NGOs). Only with the general idea of microfinance, starting with the micro-
credit system linked habitually with Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad 
Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the sphere of private economics 
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was included to a certain degree into the realm of developmental security 
agency. Since about 10 years, the notion and practice of ‘micro-insurance’ is 
making its way in developmental politics: health and food security should be 
provided to a certain degree by insurance mechanisms also for the poor which 
are normally not to be addressed by profit seeking insurance companies. Even 
micro-insurances (crop and drought insurance) against outcomes of climate 
instabilities are discussed with special catastrophe insurance schemes.2 Because 
instruments of micro-finance do address specially the poor, and so ‘everyone’, 
not only the rich or large collectives, they would fit well into the larger frame-
work of the Human Security approach. But not including insurances into the 
broader human security framework seems rather an error of the conceptual 
framing than a logical consequence of the notion: that is illustrated by the fact 
that nearly all data about global natural catastrophe statistics is borrowed by the 
UN and other institutions from the big Reinsurers MunichRe and SwissRe.3 
The most sensible observer of natural disasters is the insurance market. So, 
what seems to be a rather marginal element of contemporary security politics is 
in fact central if we follow the direction of the notion of Human Security by 
which we have to abandon for a good deal the classical distinction between 
internal and external affairs, between the different spheres like politics and 
economics to get an encompassing view of how human security could be pro-
vided. At this point, insurances seem to be a very good object of investigation 
into the history of security regimes, especially if we ask for the relationship 
between insuring practices or, more comprehensively, security regimes and the 
division of history and the present in epochs with different characters. 
I. Security Regimes and Modernity 
As said in the introductory essay to this special issue, the widening of the nar-
row political and state security into Human Security after the end of the Cold 
War is sometimes seen as a part of a return to a pre-Westphalian state of affairs 
or as a ‘new medievalism’, a coexistence of governmental, sub- and non-
governmental actors and hybrid regional-politically integrated systems instead 
of the clear definition of an international system where the only actors are 
sovereign states and no sub-governmental institutions, organizations or indi-
viduals.4 The metaphor of ‘new medievalism’ implies a certain neo-cyclical 
view of history: classical modernity becomes sandwiched between premoder-
nity and postmodernity which are structurally similar. That would also imply 
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that the widening of the notion of human security today would be similar to the 
very wide notion of security politics during enlightenment.5 Emma Rothschild, 
a distinguished historian of political theory6, finds similarly the liberalism and 
cosmopolitanism of rights directed towards the individual of the late Enlight-
enment and revolutionary wars of circa 1770 to 1820 to be the template of 
current developments.7 Even if the first attempts of investigations into the 
history of ‘human security’ by political scientists start with the idea of a certain 
recurrence in history (see below), they tend to tell a linear history of the notion 
from antiquity to the present.8 
Like the historical narrative of human security discourse, risk sociology as 
the field of social studies mostly concerned with the insurance principle has 
established its historical narrative also in a three-fold structure which at first 
seems to follow a linear, not a neo-cyclical structure:9 
- Premodernity: god-given threats, closed future 
- First / High Modernity: calculability of risks, open future 
- Second / Late Modernity: manufactured uncertainties, unknown unknowns, 
extended present 
 
Ulrich Beck, Helga Nowotny, Gerda Reith, Barbara Adams and others sug-
gest that three-step consecution of time, of risk, of security production. Beck 
holds that the insurability of hazards by private insurance companies is the best 
indicator of the borderline between ‘first modernity’ with its normal industrial 
society and ‘second modernity’ with its ‘risk society’ where we are constantly 
undertaking risks that are not manageable and where the state has always to 
play the role of the insurer of last resort.10 But that argument, which implies a 
whole historical narrative of the distinction between the last two epochs, is 
quite loosely elaborated and it is not well combined with a clear vision of how 
insurances emerged as a new instrument of security production in earlier times, 
how they were related to the division of public and private in the long history 
of the separation between those fields in different societies. The distinction 
between first / second modernity is not at all aligned with a deeper conception 
of the earlier developments. The argument seems even to start with the presup-
position that the normal would be a total cover of given risks by private insur-
ances – but in the long history since the 14th century the contrary has been 
                                                             
5  Something similar is suggesting Lüdtke 2006. 
6  She came perhaps very early in contact with the new concept of security through her hus-
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food security. 
7  Rothschild 1995. 
8  MacFarlane and Khong 2006. 
9  Beck 2007, 62-64, 234-251; Ewald 1993, 541-542. 
10  This is the thesis of Ulrich Beck (Beck 1993; repeated in: Beck 2007, 234-251.); this idea 
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always the normal and so many hybridizations between state and private issues 
were the normal – not at least because the differentiation itself between ‘pri-
vate’ and ‘public’ was a long enduring process. 
If we have those two historical narratives in security politics and political 
sciences and in risk sociology in mind, the question how time regimes and 
security regimes can be related one to each other can be raised with regards to 
the aforementioned instrument of security production, insurances. We will ask 
if and how we can differentiate between non-modern and modern forms of 
insurances and how those differences relate to timescapes and conceptions of 
spatiality. 
Insurance companies and state-based insurance institutions are, I would ar-
gue, a specific modern tool to produce security. Even if the premium insurance 
contract originates already in late medieval Italy and if we can individuate the 
medieval corporations and guilds as a second early root of insurance practices, 
nevertheless it is only at the very borders of modernity around 1680 that the 
insurance principle is fostered by specialized merchants’ companies in England 
and by the cameralist state in Germany.11 It is not the place here to discuss the 
myriads of definitions of modernity/modernities.12 With respect to our purposes 
one can identify anyway the moment of diffusion of the prime insurance prac-
tice into society beyond the traditional realm of maritime merchants as a 
marker of specific modern security regimes whether one focuses on the first 
emergence of that pattern in Europe around 1680 or on the moments of diffu-
sion into other societies in a process of globalization in the 19th century.13 
Before that shift to modernity in the realm of insurance history, it is even heu-
ristically appropriate to understand late medieval insurances as something 
‘completely different’, as just an accounting trick created in response to the 
system of double entry bookkeeping.14 The time aspect of the insurance con-
tract does not differ from the time aspect of the other transactions noted in the 
account books of double-entry book-keeping. Every transaction noted in the 
books has a time index: the expenditures happen at one time – normally earlier 
                                                             
11  Cf. Zwierlein 2010. 
12  Still an actually leading concept are the ‘multiple modernities’ stressing the multiple own 
ways of different cultures into different modernities while denying the diffusion of an over-
all and always equal form of Western Modernity: Eisenstadt 2000. Nonetheless, Eisenstadt 
uses implicitely a double notion of modernity, one stable that defines modernity as an over-
all measure valid for all societies if one wants to call a society ‘modern’, one fluid and plu-
ral for the diversity of possible phenotypes of modernity. There are still new theories of ‘the 
modernity’, corresponding to the former part of Eisenstadt’s theory, e.g. Wagner 2008, who 
argues that ‘modernity’ has a unifying core denotation, the “commitment to autonomy”. 
The different classical sociological approaches are analyzed by Martuccelli 1999. 
13  For early Insurances in England cf. Dickson 1960, 1-16.; Raynes 1964, 70-83.; Cockerell 
and Green 1976, 26-28; for the early development in Germany cf. Zwierlein 2010, chap. 
A.III, D.I.2. and Zwierlein 2009, 235-260. 
14  Cf. for that argument Zwierlein 2011. 
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– and the earnings happen at another time – normally later. It is true that the 
content of the insurance contract is special because it focuses on the possible 
occurrence or non-occurrence of a future event, while the content of a transport 
contract also aims at a future event, but just at one to be effected. Nevertheless, 
that difference is minimal and does not legitimize to understand medieval in-
surances as ‘colonizers of future’ in a definitely modern sense. If we contextu-
alize the insurance polices and the little insurance entries in the merchants’ 
ledgers with the rest of their world of communication as we can reconstruct it 
from the rest of commercial communication still extant in the archives, we 
should imagine the late medieval Mediterranean merchant encapsulated in a 
dense web of incoming and outgoing letters carried by relay couriers. The hubs 
of the Mediterranean communication and trading network from about 1380 to 
1500 were Florence, Pisa, Genova, Venice, Rome, Naples in Italy, the islands 
of Majorca and Ibiza, Valencia, Barcelona, in Spain, Perpignan, Avignon, 
Paris, Marseille, Montpelier in France and Bruges in the Netherlands; the latter 
figured as the only Mediterranean foothold in the northern maritime trading 
centers. Therefore, the 153000 letters in the Datini archive for a mere twenty 
years of communication of one single merchant family, the Datini, show that 
the merchants sent and received letters daily and hourly.15 The mental world of 
the late medieval and Renaissance merchant is, certainly, temporalized in the 
new Le Goffian sense of the merchant’s time, orientated towards the hours of 
the city clocks16, but it is also a new orientation of a networked space, a space 
clustered with some 20 important knots; it is space that divides the knots from 
each other and it is the crossing of space that brings with it the rischio ex-
pressed in the insurance polices. The main emotional focus inscribed into the 
new insurance contract was the fear concentrated on that insecure space, it was 
rather not something with an emphatic orientation on the future in the sense of 
Koselleck’s ‘open future’. That was only the case when the insurance principle 
became being reflected in an abstract way beyond the narrow circles of mari-
time merchants and lawyers. The principle became incorporated into institu-
tions – state departments or specialized commercial companies – and by that it 
was widened and abstracted.  
Even if our sources on the first broader insurance schemes of the 17th cen-
tury are always very scattered, they show that in both lands where insuring 
became already at that date a major force, in England as well as in Germany, 
there was an idea of progress and ‘improvement’ behind it: The first published 
insurance scheme in England from 1679 by Augustine Newbold was entitled 
‘Londons Improvement’ and rejoined by that the early modern discourse on 
improving agrarian and economic situations, the precursor of full modern pro-
gressive ideology. Similarly we have some evidence that Nicholas Barbon, the 
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founder of the first Fire Office in 1681, belonged to the very rare pre-18th-
century economic thinkers who believed in economic growth and progress.17 
Leibniz who, in Germany, first, in 1680, transferred the thinking on insurances 
in a wider horizon in an important advising letter to the emperor Leopold envi-
sioning a fire insurance for the whole Holy Roman Empire, also understood 
insurances as an instrument of economic growth or at least of production of 
security and of stabilization of the balance of happiness of a given society.18 
So, only in those late 17th-century contexts of early enlightened progressive 
state and economic thinking, we find insurances embedded in a vision of an 
open future; they respond now to problems of a world which is projecting itself 
in an imagined and pre-formed futurescape trying to make things (society, 
economy) greater and larger. In contrast, here before the single contracts were 
rather an accounting technique in a world where economic exchange was not 
embedded in a perception of possible growth of the whole, where it was rather 
the spatial dimension of the open sea that attracted the fears of merchants, of 
insured and insurers. 
If we concentrate in the following on fire insurances, we do that because the 
first and most important type of ‘modern’ insurances in the sense outlined 
above has always been, until the end of the 19th century, the fire insurance 
sector. 
II. The Construction of the ‘Normal Secure Society’ 
in the Enlightenment 
It is indeed only with the age of enlightenment that an ideal of a completely 
secure society is emerging. The ‘normal secure society’ is a product and a 
construction of enlightened thinking and administration. Only now the hitherto 
every-day threats and natural hazards were seen and experienced as violations 
of the expected normal: the statuses of normality and exception were reversed. 
It is the eudemonistic foundation of enlightened visions of state and society 
which led unto that end, and insurances were one of the most important ele-
ments of a normal, secure, happy society: Let’s hear one of the 18th century 
cameralists who promoted in 1756 the inauguration of territorial fire insurances 
as a part of ‘big politics’: 
The state is a society where many have assembled to maintain and promote 
their common good. Consequently all its members must participate according 
                                                             
17  Ullmer 2007; and specially Finkelstein 2000, 95-97, who asks whether the progressive 
thinking of Barbon is inspired by his heterodox millenarist descendence (his father was 
probably a preacher of the Fifth Monarchy Men, perhaps he read Giordano Bruno). For an 
actual re-contextualization of the Fire Office and Barbons activities cf. Zwierlein 2010, 
chap. D.I.1.b. 
18  Leibniz 1986, 421-432; Zwierlein 2010, chap. D.I.2.b.; and cf. Zwierlein 2008. 
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to their measure in the common happiness which is her aim […] A prince is 
obligated according to the main duties of his vocation to make the common 
happiness the main aim of his care and preoccupation and to maintain that 
happiness with the aid of the nearest, easiest and surest instruments. […] Fur-
theron, because all members of the state are obligated to maintain the common 
happiness by the virtue of their social life, according to their christians’ and 
citizens’ obligations, they are also obligated that one carries the burden of the 
other – especially there, where those burdens may cause the ruin of some 
members or of the state as a whole or at least in some of its main parts.19 
Justi, who is well known as the perhaps most straightforward eudemonistic 
cameralist20, treats the topic of insurances in his ‘State economy [Staatswirths-
chaft]’ under the main rubric ‘About the prince’s methods and measures to 
maintain and increase the wealth of the state promoting by that way the happi-
ness of the subjects”.21 Besides the fact that the orientation at happiness was 
generally the all overarching topic of cameralist thinking in the 1750ies, for the 
insurance theorists it was intrinsically important because insurances were 
thought of as ‘institutions against accidents [Anstalten wider die Unglücks-
fälle]’22 – accidents, Unglücke, like blazes and conflagrations, were just the 
reverse of Glück, the happiness at which the state aimed. At this point, the old 
notion of the casus fortuiti was still shining through all its metamorphoses, 
from the narrow sense in the Roman law of impairment of performance to its 
application to a realm beyond the law of obligations: the law of insurance in the 
maritime trade.23 Unglücke like floods, conflagrations, epidemics were a minus 
in the balance of happiness and had to be prevented. 
More general remarks on the place of insurances in a wider model of society 
and state are only to be found in later treatises. Ferdinand Friedrich Pfeiffer, a 
school friend of Friedrich Schiller an otherwise not important Wurttemberg 
public servant (teacher, than secretary of the chamber), started his treatise on 
insurances in a half neo-Aristotelian, half Rousseauian way from the very ori-
gins of human society, the association of many for common purposes following 
the destiny of man (instinct of self-preservation, necessity to combine forces to 
enable human progress). 
If the security of a nation is threatened from one side, the whole society is 
obliged to remove the danger if possible or at least to share the inevitable mis-
fortune that hit every single man because from now on no one lives for him-
                                                             
19  Anonymous, Vorschlag 1756, 675, 702. 
20  Cf. Engelhardt 1981; Adam 2006. 
21  Justi 1758, 284-289. 
22  That is a common rubric under which insurances are treated in more general academic 
introduction books into cameralism: Pfeiffer 1779, chap. 3 ‚Wider die Unglücksfälle, sind 
vernünftige Maßregeln zu nehmen‘, 332-340; Pfeiffer 1783, chap. 32 ‚Von den Verwah-
rungsmitteln wider die Unglücksfälle‘, 567-680; similar Jung 1788, 4. Hauptstück ‚Unsi-
cherheit des Eigenthums durch Unglücksfälle‘, 360-390. 
23  Cf. FN 18. 
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self. Without doubt the base of all institutions to insure the property and in a 
certain way also the income/profit [Ertrag] lies in the nature of the social con-
tract because they are founding a greater security of life by ensuring liveli-
hood.24 
Pfeiffer asserts also with proud that only nowadays in enlightened times one  
does not aspire [sc. to stabilize] the inner security [of a state] by the external 
security but vice versa the external by the inner because it has been realized 
that those states where the best possible police institutions were to be found 
usually had also the most potential instruments to procure security from exter-
nal threats and to guarantee its duration.25 
So, according to Pfeiffer, state-biased insurance institutions like the fire in-
surances belong to an enlightenment governmentality which reverses the pri-
mate of foreign affairs into a primate of domestic policy. Pfeiffer at this point is 
not citing Rousseau’s Du contrat social but Emile: 
Natural man is everything for himself. He is the numerical unit, the absolute 
whole, accountable only to himself or to his own kind. Civil man is only a 
fractional unit dependent on the denominator, whose value is in his relation-
ship with the whole, that is, the social body. Good social institutions are those 
that know best how to denature man, to take away his absolute existence in 
order to give him a relative one, and to transport the “me” into a common uni-
ty so that each individual no longer regards himself as one but as a part of the 
unity and is sensitive only to the whole.26 
The difference between natural man and citizen enrooted in the social con-
tract is expressed here by Rousseau in a mathematical manner, as it is often the 
case in his political theory. Pfeiffer is citing this ‘mathematical’ version of the 
social contract in relationship to the insurance institutions because in those 
institutions, the ‘conversion’ of subjects, buildings, cities into numbers was 
most evident. The numbers and sums of insured property prevailed in the per-
ception of the world as capital. The construction of a ‘secure normal society’ 
went hand in hand with a conversion of society into numbers.27 In nearly all 
texts published from the 1750ies onwards the big promise which enlightened 
administrators found in the insurances lay in their potential to increase ‘credit’. 
In one of his contributions to insurance theory, Justi arranged the passage on 
insurances explicitely under the rubric ‘Of the country’s credit’: as one of the 
most important instruments to promote ‘circulation’ – one of the main aims of 
enlightened economic vision28 – the country’s credit had to be as perfect as 
possible. He divides into 1) the prince’s credit, 2) the public credit of the coun-
try which means a) the credit of the whole country with other nations, or b) the 
                                                             
24  Pfeiffer 1780, 2. 
25  Pfeiffer 1780, 3. 
26  Rousseau 1969, 249, cited by Pfeiffer 1780, 2. 
27  Cf. for the prehistory of such processes Crosby 1997. 
28  Cf. Schmidt and Sandl 2002. 
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credit of the estates and their exchequers, or c) the credit of a big common 
commercial society which represents the whole nation, 3) the particular credit 
in the country which for Justi seems to mean the average easiness for particular 
people to get a private loan.29 Natural hazards diminish the wealth and credit of 
particulars. But insurances do not only help to balance the deficit at plus minus 
0, the dream of enlightened thinkers was that they could double the particular 
credit in a certain way, because insured houses were much more mortgageable 
and would enable hereby a greater circulation of capital. Here reflections typi-
cally start with the topos that uninsured houses are to be perceived as future 
piles of ashes, whereas insured houses are like a second ‘virtual’ house, the 
rebuilt house in the future, added to the capital of the owner. Or in nowadays 
economic language: Insured houses enable an intertemporal transfer of propri-
ety and were counted among admitted assets.30 
It is a truth affirmed by experience that the security with which we can enjoy a 
thing much increases its value and vice versa that the value of a thing de-
creases to the same degree as we are exposed to greater and manifold threats 
in respect to that thing […]. So it is natural that also buildings have to receive 
a much higher value if they are not exposed to fire hazard or, which is the 
same, if in the case that they perish in a conflagration an indemnity will be 
paid. […] So, many well off people will decide much easier to build or buy a 
house if they are sure that their invested capital does not perish through a con-
flagration. As the value of the buildings increases, also the fortune of every 
proprietor increases and in consequence the fortune of the whole state, of 
which the buildings form an important part. With the fortune there also pro-
gressively increases a country’s credit.31 
So, enlightened thinking and practice of insuring firstly founded the normal 
secure society which was also a society of wealth, of growth and a society of 
numbers. 
                                                             
29  Justi 1758, 276. 
30  Someone who insures his house has „also in der That noch ein Haus in der Casse, oder sein 
ietziges Haus sicherer, und dieses wird dadurch ein solideres Stück seines Vermögens, die-
ses aber dem Werthe nach eben darum erhöhet.“ Uninsured houses are to be seen „als einen 
Brandhaufen im voraus“. On insured houses one can borrow money with greater security, 
so an insurance is an instrument to increase the wealth of a city (Georg Heinrich Zincke: 
Vorrede zum Siebenden Bande der Sammlungen. Von den nöthigen Policey-Anstalten in 
Städten, wegen derer Folgen und Wirckungen der Unglücks-Fälle, die man nicht verhüten 
können; insonderheit aber denen Feuer- und Brand-Cassen, in: Leipziger Sammlungen 
1751, III-LIV, XXVI. The topos of the uninsured houses as possible or future piles of ashes 
also Anonymous, Gedanken 1751, 294; Anonymous, Vorschlag 1756, 675; Moser 1754, 3; 
Schaeffer 1791, 1v; Waser 1778, 5. 
31  Gäng 1792, 20. 
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III. Timescapes and Spatialities of Insuring 
in High-Modern Times 
Contemporary risk sociology understands Insuring always as a man’s tool to 
‘colonize the future’ using the notion of Torsten Hägerstrand rendered famous 
by the systematization of Anthony Giddens:32 Insurance is a child of modernity 
because by calculating probabilities of hazards, threats hitherto experienced 
helplessly as Acts of God are converted into clearly delineable parts of a future 
which can be planified. The calculable and colonized ‘future’ is isomorphic 
with the present, a present just not yet here. 
Guided by those ideas, insurance history was always combined with the his-
tory of sciences and the history of probability, a theme rendered very well-
known by the historians who had studied that what they had called the 18th 
century ‘probabilistic revolution’. But probabilistic mathematical theory did 
play a role in insurance practice only in the realm of Life Insurance and only 
very lately at the end of 18th century in Britain. The most important branch of 
the fire insurance operated nearly until the 20th century without any application 
of probabilistic theory. So, how much ‘taming of future’ is visible in the prac-
tice of insuring in classical modernity? Let’s look at the work of 19th century 
insurance agents of the then world’s oldest and biggest fire insurance company, 
the Sun Fire Office, founded in 1720: from 1835 on and strongly after 1850 
that insurance company as other British companies spread over the world in a 
breath-taking quick process of globalizing business. Indeed the company’s 
agents did collect local fire data and extrapolated from past fire distribution 
into the future, but always very roughly, never using probabilistic theory. Fix-
ing the primes was a process of trial and error or rather of imitation and falsifi-
cation following the first insurances installed on the site and then trying out 
what rates would function durably. 
We have a very precious genre of sources in the archives of the Sun Fire Of-
fice besides business balances, management minutes and some correspon-
dances to study the globalization of business, the so-called ‘memorandum 
books’. Those about 300 volumes, each with some 200 to 400 pages consist of 
detailed reports on foreign agencies, describing inter alia the extent of local fire 
insurance, fire brigade provision and recent notable fires. Usually the volumes 
were compiled on the inspection of an agency by visiting members of the For-
eign Department (often by Francis Boyer Relton, Foreign Superintendent from 
1868 and George Saward Manvell, Clerk in the Foreign Department from 
1864). Along with hand-written analysises by the men at place and by the 
members of the Foreign department in London, the volumes often contain 
                                                             
32  Hägerstrand 1988; Giddens 1991, 109-143; Reith 2004. 
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sketch plans, photographs, newspaper clippings,33 printed circulars and statis-
tics. Those volumes functioned as a sort of steadily growing special encyclope-
dia and in-house knowledge ressource of the London headquarter. It was stra-
tegic orientative knowledge about the hundreds of places on the globe where 
the insurance was active, a certain kind of a global economic memory.34 They 
already were used by Dickson in his monograph on the Sun Insurance35 but 
they still contain a huge bulk of unused material. The agency made them acces-
sible to the public not before 1994 when they were handed out to the Guildhall 
Library London.36 
What forms of perception, of timescapes and spatiality do we find expressed 
in the writings and analyses of 19th century insurance agents? For the agent 
Woods who analyzed where in Istanbul the Company should engage, only the 
6th district, being the area of the city elected for modernization, seemed to be a 
secure starting point for insurance business. Woods provided himself with a 
German map of the 6th district of 1861 (with French inscriptions). Already in 
the original print, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Christian’ blocks of streets were divided visu-
ally (grey vs. pink areas) according to the habitual division which reigned in 
the city.37 Woods now walked through the whole district, analyzed all the 
streets and marked in red the blocks where the building stock was in his opin-
ion good enough to be insurable: in any case this only applied to Christian 
blocks according to Woods.38 In Pera and in Galata – in the latter quarter, 
nearly all houses were built of stone – he applied yet another criteria of dis-
crimination: 
I have rejected these portions of Galata & Pera where there is either a great 
mass of very inferior wooden buildings or where the Houses, stone or woo-
                                                             
33  Unfortunately, the clippings not always reveal all source information (name of the newspa-
per, date, page). 
34  As to my knowledge, at least for British and German insurances and with the exception 
perhaps of the Phoenix material in the Cambridge University library, there exists no other 
comparable big corpus giving insight into the logistic and cultural orientation of a globaliz-
ing insurance company in 19th century. Today we can find some similarly constituted ar-
chives: The Natural risk department of the MunichRe, Germany, for example disposes of a 
suspension file archive on global regions from the 1950ies onwards which parallels the 19th 
century precursor, but certainly – as belonging to a Reinsurer – it does not contain informa-
tion about agencies. 
35  Dickson 1960, 162-233. 
36  Guildhall Library London [hereafter GLL] Ms 31522 vol. 257 to 266. 
37  „The colors Brown & Pink characterize respectively the Turkish & Christian quarters as 
nearly as possible, but as the map was made several years ago, some portions of the brown 
might now be colored pink.” (GLL Ms. 31522 vol. 258, 72). 
38  The map in GLL Ms. 31522 vol. 257, Appendix: ‘Plan der zum 6.ten Communalbezirk 
vereinigten Vorstädte Galata, Pera und Pancaldi von Constantinopel […] ergänzt […] bis 
ins Jahr 1861 durch C. Stolpe [...] / Plan des Faubourgs de Constantinople Galata, Pera et 
Pancaldi [...]’. A grey reproduction is to be found under <http://www.sfb-frueheneuzeit.uni-
muenchen.de/mitteilungen/M1-2009/zwierlein.pdf, 25> (accessed August 7, 2010). 
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den, are devoted to drunkeness or debauchery – for the former reason I have 
omitted to color nearly the whole of the district which lies on the north side of 
the Grande Rue de Pera for the latter reason, I have omitted several blocks 
which are entirely given up to people of bad character.39 
The heuristics of insurability thus spatially extracts the supposedly secure 
christian-european, stone-built and morally civilized ‘modernity’ out of the 
aggregate of the closely contiguous plurality of ‘nationalities’ and cultures. In 
1865, a huge fire destroyed large parts of the Muslim quarter of Istanbul 
(Stamboul) and seemed to confirm the prejudices of the insurance company. 
But only five years later another big fire destroyed exactly the quarters of the 
European 6th district in Galata and Pera where the company had engaged 
largely: all the prudent labours of agent Woods to cut out the pretended secure 
space revealed fruitless. 
A similar but inverse story happened in Bombay; again, the Sun Fire Office 
gave directives oriented on limitations of cultural space: 
[…] but it is considered a point of great importance, to limit our Insurances 
strictly to those for European Firms & of the best Class of Buildings only. Our 
rule of business must, for the present at least, altogether exclude insurances 
for native Firms & be confined as to locality to the European part of the Port 
& Colaba on the same terms as the Imperial – say 18 annas pr C for the former 
& 14 annas pr C for the latter.40 
The firm aimed strongly at a precise definition of the space where insur-
ances were to be taken and where not following a very strong orientalist di-
chotomy between ‘native’ and ‘European’: 
First, as to the definition of the term ‘Native Town’, we think that this term 
should be applied only to that part of the island inhabited exclusively by na-
tives and which you will find marked ‘Native Town’ in the small map accom-
panying the Times of India Calendar forwarded to you by last mail. We do not 
as a rule, recommend the acceptance of such risks, but your Managers might 
have us a discretionary power in the matter, in that case we should use the 
greatest caution, and with regard to the rates we submit that they should be the 
same as those charged by the Alliance & Phoenix, in preference to that given 
by the North British.41 
But after some years of engagement in India, the Sun realized that things 
were very different on that subcontinent in comparison with all their experi-
ences. The insurance company tried again to get a very precise definition of the 
‘good European’ space to insure and of the ‘bad native’ space to be avoided. 
They drew up maps indicating thoroughly the limits between both spaces, in 
1893 even the general assembly of all Insurance company agents acting in 
                                                             
39  GLL Ms. 31522 vol. 258, 72. 
40  Sun Fire Office London an die Agenten Leckie & Co., Bombay, 12.8.1852: GLL Ms. 
18249, vol. 13, f. 14v. 
41  Ibid., 258. 
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Bombay (Bombay Association of Fire Insurance Agents) came up with a for-
mal consensus about those limitis between native and european distributing a 
map only of those limits among all agents. The companies were suspicious 
against the native way of building: all houses were built “with a very heavy 
proportion of wood-work, in a large number of cases the frame work, the floors 
and roofs are finished before a wall is commenced either external or internal”. 
 
 
Map of Bombay from the /Times of India/ 1866 (GLL Ms. 31522 vol. 152, p. 127). 
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1893 Consensus of all Insurance agencies on the borders of the insurable ‘European town’ in 
Bombay (GLL Ms. 31522, vol. 152, p. 127; vol. 156, p. 324). 
 
But after some twenty years of business in India with permanently low 
losses they were surprised “how few fires there are either in the Fort or thickly 
populated native town, and still more surprising when a fire does occur, how 
very rarely it is known to spread to the adjoining houses”.42 An author in the 
Bombay Gazette uttered his astonishment still in 1883: 
We have never been, in a large city, so exempt from serious fires as Bombay. 
In one year a greater destruction of property from this cause takes place in 
New York than we have known in 35 years in Bombay. We confess that we 
are unable to explain the comparative immunity of Bombay in this particular. 
The agents noted that the “natives, who, encouraged by the immunity from 
Fire which Bombay has so long enjoyed, prefer to take their chance rather than 
pay the heavy rates asked for.”43 
There were many cumulative reasons for the missing of major conflagra-
tions in the three important British-Indian cities Bombay, Calcutta and Madras: 
teak wood and the refractory chunam mortar is much less inflammable than 
                                                             
42  Extract from report by Messrs. Scott & McLelland [1872], GLL Ms. 31522, vol. 153, p. 
112-113. 
43  Ibid. 
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normal European wood and mortar, the monsun occupying nearly half of the 
year is producing such a humid climate that the outbreak of fires is much less 
probable. If modern cities are cities free of the danger of big conflagrations, 
perhaps the traditional Indian cities were in a certain way since a long time 
‘modern’ even if they seemed to a European visitor in many other respects 
completely unmodern – one empirical data to enforce Eisenstadts argument of 
the multiplicy of modernities.44 
The two examples of late 19th century analyzing processes by insurance 
agents in the age of globalizing business do teach us some general lessons: We 
are in front of two disoriented seemingly empirical and rational ‘high-modern’ 
Western perceptions of different largely non-European cities – disoriented, 
because the spatial division between European and Muslim zones in Istanbul 
did not function as a valid marker of higher or lower risk: the risk was much to 
high in both areas; disoriented, because the similar spatial division between 
European and native zones in the Indian cities had not any sense being no real 
fire risk in both zones. The failure of those pre-formed schemes of perception 
shows that under conditions of globalization the previously seemingly univer-
sal distinction between ‘Tradition’ and ‘Modernity’ is reduced to a rather arbi-
trary labeling depending on the standpoint of the attributing person; what re-
mains is pure diversity with no given epochal index.45  
Analyzing the schemes of perception, we see that the guiding principle is 
rather not a general mood of future orientation, even if perhaps a general con-
viction of progress is behind the big movement of globalization. The agents did 
not use much time-related vocabulary when they analyzed a new site for an 
agency. On the contrary, a deeply spatialized vision of the cities in question 
and of ‘insurability’ was frequent, the zoning of risk followed that pre-given 
division of spaces. Surely, insuring was still a business selling the security of (a 
well defined part of) one own’s ‘future’.46 It was still a modern instrument in 
the sense we defined it in the first part in contrast to the late medieval notion of 
insuring. The orientation of preoccupation, care or even fear was not concen-
trated and even mingled with the open space of the sea and with the wandering 
of goods through that space as in the Mediterranean case, insuring was not just 
an accounting trick but a tool of ‘taming the future’ to vary the formulation of 
Ian Hacking. But the zoning of risk reintroduced a heavy mood of spatial orien-
tation and segregation of the fears on which insurers and insured were concen-
trated. Insurance having become a sober routine, the agents did not show much 
                                                             
44  Eisenstadt 2007. 
45  Stichweh 2000, 207-219. 
46  To clarify this, we could distinguish here between a ‘future1’ and a ‘future2’, the former 
meaning the operational orientation of insurances on well-defined risks (the burning of 
houses), the latter meaning the broader social, political and economic timescape in which 
the insurance processes as a whole are embedded. 
 268
conviction to act as promoters of progress as it was the case with the enlight-
ened pioneers establishing the first insurances in 18th century when they con-
textualized the functions of insurances in broader schemes of the progress of 
society, state and its economy. Insuring one’s property’s future was less linked 
with Insurance as an agent of the future orientation of states and societies 
themselves or that link was bracketed and neutralized in the daily practice. If 
spatial zoning was not functional in dividing West/Non-West and as such be-
tween ‘Modernity’ and ‘Tradition’, insurance and insurability itself failed to be 
a marker between ‘epochs’; so, the Overvaluing of Spatiality led to a certain 
presentisme (re-)conquering the practice of insuring. 
If in those examples the frontiers of insurability are crossfaded with the 
frontiers of Westerness in a deeply counterfactual way, that what is coined 
‘uninsurable’ is not the unthinkable and uncalculable mega-catastrophe, it is 
just the non-western part of the world. Beck and others think that the measure 
of ‘insurability’ is also a tool of distinction between first and second modernity, 
between high and post-modernity, but we could not find that well documented 
in the material. Surely the argument was rather that dangers like a maximum 
credible accident in nuclear power plants or like effects of terrorism are never 
insured as risks, that those types of dangers transcend the frontiers of account-
ability, that with those ‘new’ technological dangers like the nuclear ones we are 
facing signs of a new age and a new epoch which are completely beyond the 
imagination of traditional normal modern institutions like insurance companies. 
But that thesis is not convincing probably on multiple levels. One argument for 
the contemporary situation is that the frontier of insurability has always been 
enlarged and extended and that, for example, even terrorism has been insurable 
to some extent.47 Another argument looking at the examples given from 19th 
century modernity would be that the frontier of insurability has been always 
traced by the insurance agencies along some preformed divisions like that 
between westerness and non-westerness without any strong empirical backing 
as has been shown. So, the uninsurable is not necessarily the unmarked space 
of the great unknown, and in an auto-reflexive way, ‘insurability’ is a marker 
of selected forms of cultural spaces and their frontiers. 
IV. Insuring at the Edges of Late Modernity 
Facing the global ‘new’ risks or uncertainties of climate change in a world 
divided into a changing ‘multiple West’, ‘developing’ countries, and future 
leading states, insurances are more and more at the center of interest and dis-
cussion as actors of global security production. The enlightenment had con-
structed the secure society as the normal ideal, as a promoter of wealth and 
                                                             
47  Ericson and Doyle 2004. 
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progress and, vice versa, states of unhappiness and misfortune as the exception. 
In late modernity the notion of ‘insurability’ has gained more and more impor-
tance as a contested marker of the boundaries between normal modernity and 
the unmodern; having had a closer look at that boundary we have seen that it 
was rather a purely self-referential boundary of ‘westerness’ without defining 
really the boundaries of empirical insurability. 
In the contemporary world, the concept of ‘insurability’ is used as a heuris-
tic instrument transferred from insurance theory to the discussion on sustain-
ability governance. It is argued that from the existing relation between techno-
logical innovation, risk definition by insurers and sustainable development, the 
expertise of insurance business in defining insurable risks can be used as an 
indicator in analyzing the ‘borderline’ between nation-states and private busi-
ness as actors, but also the ‘borderline’ between sustainable and unsustainable 
technology, presuming that uninsurable technology is also unsustainable.48 
Only actions of which the risk of environmental destruction is measurable and, 
in case of necessity, manageable or avoidable, can claim to be legitimate from 
a sustainability perspective. Similarly, an insurer would sign only risks which 
are measurable and, in case of necessity, payable without ruining the company.  
In other contexts, analysts of climate politics do ask for “Innovations in in-
surance” and they express that “New thinking will be needed to push back the 
boundaries of insurability”. Only if insurers will create new products, the state 
as insurer of last resort will be discharged. Only new products of micro-
insurance can help to penetrate the developing world and to increase the overall 
degree of ‘human security’.49 So, in a certain way, insurances are objects of 
hope; even sociologists like Anthony Giddens who subscribe like Beck to the 
vision of a late or post-modernity as a new and different age in contrast to the 
classic ‘modernity’, judge that by pushing back the boundaries of insurability, 
some ground will be gained for humanity. 
In a certain way one may judge that the fact that insurance and reinsurance 
giants are nowadays actors on a same level of importance for the management 
of global catastrophes as whole states. That shows that the enlightenment vi-
sion or utopia of a normal secure society is, to a certain extent, realized or is, at 
least, still present as a vision, perhaps an utopia, but at least as a directing idea. 
Asking for new insurance innovations for developing countries, like Giddens is 
doing, seems to be in a good continuity to that enlightenment vision. But study-
ing the insurance practices of classical 19th century modernity with its strong 
emphasis on cultural spatiality and the multiplicity of forms and outcomes, it 
seems rather that the somewhat steady binarity and dichotomy of secure spaces 
                                                             
48  Stahel 2003; Dahlström et al. 2003. 
49  Giddens 2009, 172-174; cf. also Stern 2009, 88-89. 
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and unsecure spaces is continued or even re-enforced today.50 If we look at the 
notion of insurability depending rather on preformed schemes in the 19th cen-
tury and if we have in mind how that expertise in delineating the borders of 
insurability was completely erroneous, one may wonder if one is well advised 
to use that ‘knowledge’ on so many levels: on the level of sociological theory 
to divide epochs; on the level of sustainable economics to define environmen-
tally prudent actions; on the level of climate politics to enlarge the secure 
world. 
Classical modern insurance practices in the context of globalization seemed 
to have lost much of the mood of ‘colonizing the future’. May we close with 
the idea that the process of globalization itself was active in a certain de-
temporalization of insuring? Hartmut Rosa has written on the process of ‘de-
celeration’ (Entschleunigung) as the general outcome of globalization, Helga 
Nowotny has underlined that an ‘extended present’ is increasingly replacing the 
open future of classical modernity in the globalized world. Perhaps, the prac-
tice of modern insuring that was formerly linked with that open future as a 
particularly significant instrument of ‘taming’ and calculating that future would 
be more and more an action oriented dominantly in timescapes of presentness 
and would follow the fixation on ‘zoning’.51 Future-orientation would be 
shrunk down to presentedness? or to something like a ‘project time’ with a 
fixed future which would resemble more the closed future of premodernity than 
the open future of classical modernity.52 Thus, our investigation seems to con-
solidate the three-step form of time regimes and spatialities in the realm of 
insurance practice and theory. But, from a historical perspective of the com-
parison between different epochs, it also casts doubt on the validity and impor-
tance of ‘insurability’ as a mighty theoretical and practical tool of measurement 
in different contexts. In this way, the article should have contributed to the 
history of human security or the use of ‘human security’ as a heuristical device 
in historical research by concentration on the relations between timescapes and 
spatialities as correlates to regimes of security: analysing those elements and 
dimensions and their interrelations together may be a step to a more formalized 
practice of transepochal comparisons and a transepochally arguing history of 
human security that would not just be a research on the ‘prehistory’ of patterns 
of human security. 
                                                             
50  Slums are still burning down uninsured in the growing mega-cities with its ‘western’ cen-
ters well insured: Davis 2007, 129-136. 
51  Cf. for the practice of spatial zoning in the context of insuring also the contribution of Uwe 
Luebken in this volume; cf. also the yet unpublished Bochum Master thesis of Christoph 
Wehner on the practice of risk zoning in the context of insuring elements of nuclear power 
planes. 
52  That’s the argument or the pleading of Dupuy 2004, 175-197, following the ideas of Hans 
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